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TAXATION - FEDERAL GIFT TAX - T AXABILITY OF INTEREST p ASSING
CREATION OF TENANCY BY ENTIRETY-On September 20, 1933, petitioner
transferred by deed realty owned by him in fee to · himself and his wife as
tenants by the entirety. The commissioner of internal revenue determined that
the transfer constituted a taxable gift under the Gift Tax Act of 1932. Petitioner took an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals. Held, with one dissent,
that such creation of a tenancy by the entireties did not constitute a taxable
transfer under the Gift Tax Act. Hart v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. No.
176 (Dec. 28, 1937).
In December, 1932, plaintiff and his wife acquired realty as tenants
by the entirety, the plaintiff personally furnishing eleven-twelfths of the consideration, the remaining one-twelfth being proceeds of a sale for former realty
held by the entirety. The commissioner determined that the transfer was a
taxable gift to the wife under the Gift Tax Act of r932, and valued the life
interest and the interest on survivorship. The taxpayer .instituted action in the
federal district court to recover the taxes paid by him, and the court, without
opinion, allowed recovery of the gift tax allowed by the collector on these
transactions.1 The government appealed. Held, that the transfer to the wife
constituted a taxable transfer under the Gift Tax Act and that the judgment
of the district court should be reversed. Lilly v. Smith, Collector, ( C. C. A.
7th, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 341, certiorari denied (U.S. 1938) 59 S. Ct. 64.
The gift tax is a tax laid not upon property, but upon the gift or transfer
of property.2 The tax is not limited in its imposition to transfers which at
AT

37-1 U. S. T. C., 1f 9101.
Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 169, § 501(a), 26 U.S. C. (1935), § 550.
For a holding to this effect under the Revenue Act of 1924, equally applicable to the
Revenue Act of 1932, see Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 S. Ct. 46
(1929); Treasury Regulations 79, art. 1.
1

2
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common law are treated as gifts, but extends to sales and exchanges for less
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, and reaches
all transfers to the extent that they are donative in character.8 The act itself does
not expressly cover transfers such as those involved in the cases under discussion.' However, the Treasury Department, in promulgating Regulations 79,
takes the position that the act 15 is broad enough to reach such transfers. 6 The
common-law view is that on the creation of a tenancy by the entireties each
spouse becomes seized of the whole estate. 7 Thus the creation of a tenancy by the
entirety, where the consideration is furnished by one spouse, could be justifiably
taxed as a gift on the technical ground that upon the expenditure of consideration by either the husband or the wife, the non-contributing spouse, according
to "the amiable fiction of the common law," receives the whole estate. However, it is not necessary to resort to so conceptualistic a justification. While
realistically each tenant by the entirety does not take the whole estate, yet
certain rights do accrue to each. The more important of those rights are that
each tenant has the right to one-half the rents and profits of the estate, 8 and the
right to take the whole estate on survivorship, which right cannot be defeated
by the other tenant, either by deed or by will. 9 It would therefore seem that
there has been a sufficient transfer of property interest to the wife, in the instant
cases, for which she has not given "adequate and full consideration in money
8

Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 69, § 501 (a) (b), 26 U. S. C. (1935),

§ 550; Treasury Regulations 79, art. 1.
'Hart v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A., No. 176 (1937).
15
Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 169, § 501: ~'(a) For the calendar year
1932 and each calendar year thereafter a tax ••• shall be imposed on the transfer during such calendar year by any individual, resident or nonresident, of property by
gift. (b) The tax shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the
gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or
intangible••••" § 503: "Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which the value
of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall, for the purpose of the
tax imposed by this title, be deemed a gift••••" 26 U. S. C. (1935), §§ 550, 552.
11
Treasury Regulations 79, art. 2: "In the following examples of transactions
resulting in taxable gifts, it will be understood that the transactions occurred after the
date of the enactment of the statute, and were not for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth: (7) If a husband with his own funds purchases
property and has the title thereto conveyed to himself and his wife as tenants by the
entirety ••• there is a gift to the wife.•••" Art. 19: "(8) Tenancies by the entirety.
Should either a husband or his wife purchase property and cause the title thereto to
be conveyed to themselves as tenants by the entirety, or should either cause to be
created such a tenancy in property already owned by him or her • • • the transfer
effects a gift of the tenancy from the spouse owning the property at the time of the
creation of the tenancy or who furnished the consideration in the purchase of the
property."
1
2 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 182, I JoNES' BLACKSTONE 957, note ,c.
(1915); Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 109, 53 S. Ct. 534 (1933).
8
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., 852 (1920).
9
lbid., 645.
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or money's worth"-a sufficient shift in "economic benefits" 10-to warrant
the position of the Treasury Department that such a transfer is covered by the
act. This position is especially warranted since the regulations place the value
of the gift at the present worth of the right, if any, to a portion of the income
of the property, plus the present worth of the right to absolute title, determined
on the basis of the probability of surviving the donor.11 Thus, if the gift tax
alone is taken into consideration, it would seem that, of the two cases under
discussion, Lilly v. Smith represents the better view. However another factor
to be taken into consideration is that on the death of one of the tenants by the
entirety the whole value of the realty so held must be included in computing
the gross estate for the purposes of the federal estate tax.12 Consequently the
imposition of a gift tax on the same transaction at an earlier date seems to
indicate an inconsistent theory and to result in a duplication of taxes.18 But
in sustaining the provisions of the Revenue Act,14 requiring the inclusion in the
gross estate of property held by the entirety, the court admittedly forsook the
common-law theory that the survivor's rights did not arise at the time of the
death of the other spouse but dated back to the original limitation instead; it
said that while technically no "transfer" occurred at death, the ripening of
rights in the survivor (here the ability freely to dispose of the property and to
receive the full income) was an event which could be made the subject of a
tax, which Congress might denominate a transfer tax, a death duty, or anything else it saw fit. 15 And the whole value of the estate could be included as a
means of measuring the tax because it bore a sufficient relation to the subject
1 °For a case stressing the shifting of economic benefits as the subject of a gift
tax under the 1924 act, see Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 53 S. Ct. 369
( I 93 3). For cases stressing the shifting of economic benefits as the subject of succession
taxes under the federal estate tax, see Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48
S. Ct. 225 (1928); Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 S. Ct. 356 (1930);
Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929);
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929).
11 Treasury Regulations 79, art. I 9.
12 Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L, 9, § 302 (as amended by section 404 of
the Revenue Act of 1934): "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or
personal, tangible or intangible ••• (e) To the extent of the interest therein held
••• as tenants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse..•." 26 U. S. C. (1935),
§ 411e. This section was held constitutional, as applied to a subsequently created tenancy by the entirety, in Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 50 S. Ct. 356 (1930).
See notes on this case in 44 HARv. L. REV. 130 (1930); 27 MICH. L. REV. 593
. (1929).
13 BREWSTER, Ivrns and PHILLIPS, THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX 28 (1933).
14 Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 9, § 302 (e), 15 U.S. C. (1935), § 411e.
See note I 2, supra.
15 Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 S. Ct. 356 (1930). See Surrey and
Aronson, "Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax," 32 CoL. L. REv. 1332
(1932). However, one of the factors influencing the decision in the Tyler case, that
of preventing avoidance of the estate tax by inter vivas transfers which roughly had the
effect of testamentary disposition, now has less force inasmuch as inter vivas transfers,
since 1932, may be taxed as gifts.
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of the tax. 16 The objection concerning duplication of taxes may be answered, in
part at least, by the fact that transfers of property taxed as gifts, the subject
matter of which must also be included in the gross estate in computing the
estate tax, give rise to a gift tax credit against the estate tax.17 It may, however,
seem somewhat unnecessary and futile to require the payment of a gift tax when
it is known at the time that on the death of the donor the transfer will be taxed
under the estate tax, at which time a credit for the gift tax presently paid will be
given.18 But some practical differences exist between such treatment and taxing
the transfer under the estate tax only. In computing the credit, the value of the
gift is the value determined for the purpose of the gift tax or the value determined for the purpose of the estate tax, whichever is lower.10 So if the value of
the gift depreciates after the gift is made, the value of the gift will be greater for
gift tax purposes than for estate tax purposes, and under the statutory formula
it will not be possible to realize a full credit for the gift tax. Also, many states
impose an estate tax equal to eighty per cent of the federal estate tax computed
without credit for the gift tax paid to the federal government. 20 The federal
law, however, limits the credit allowed for such state taxes to eighty per cent
of the federal estate tax after the deduction of the gift tax credit. 21 Consequently,
if the transfer is treated as a gift and also included in the gross estate, with a
credit for the gift tax paid, the credit for state estate taxes paid will be less than
if the transfer were taxed under the estate tax only. This, however, is a problem
calling for legislative rather than judicial solution. 22

Ben H. Dewey
16

See the per curiam opinion in Helvering v. Bowers, (U. S. 1938) 58 S. Ct.
5z5, reversing Bowers v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 90 F. (zd) 790,
which had held that only one-half the value was includable. See also Surrey and
Aronson, "Inter Vivos Transfers and the Federal Estate Tax," 3z CoL. L. REv. 1332
at 1347 (1932).
17
See Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 9, § 301 (b) (as amended by section
801 of the Revenue Act of 1932), 26 U.S. C. (1935), § 413a. Treasury Regulations
80, art. 9 (a).
18
Such a procedure must also be followed where there are gifts in contemplation
of death, and gifts to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death. BREWSTER, IvINs,
and PHILLIPS, THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX 7 (1933).
19
Treasury Regulations 80, art. 9 (a): "credit for gift tax paid on gifts made by
the decedent under the Gift Tax Act oE 1932 .•• is allowed against the estate tax
imposed by section 301 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1926. Such credit cannot exceed
an amount which bears the same ratio to the gross tax computed under the provisions
of the Revenue Act of 1926 as the value of the property which was included for the
purpose of the gift tax and also included in the gross estate bears to the value of the
entire gross estate. In computing this ratio, the value of such property is the value
determined for the purpose of the gift tax or the value determined for the purpose of
the estate tax, whichever is the lower." A similar credit is allowed against the additional tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1932.
20
BREWSTER, IvINs, and PHILLIPS, THE FEDERAL G1FT TAX 8 (1933).
21
Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. L. 9, § 301 (c) (as amended by section 802
of the Revenue Act of 1932), 26 U.S. C. (1935), § 413b. Treasury Regulations 80,
art. 9 (b). ,
22
See Report of Subcommittee of House Ways and Means Committee on a Proposed Revision of the Revenue Laws, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., p. 61 (1938).

